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A Case for Judicial Balancing: Justice Stevens and
the First Amendment
The Supreme Court's approach to first amendment adjudi-
cation is an amalgam of several distinct doctrinal developments.'
Government may regulate "political speech" if it is inciteful; 2
commercial speech if the governmental interest outweighs the
speaker's interest;' and obscenity, because it is not speech enti-
tled to first amendment protection.' The Court's opinions, how-
ever, fail to enunciate a comprehensive theory of first amendment
analysis,5 thus obscuring the underlying issues and producing in-
consistent results.' In obscenity cases the Court uses the non-
speech concept, or categorization technique, to avoid first amend-
ment analysis by placing the speech wholly outside of constitu-
tional protection.7
Justice John Stevens, the newest member of the Court," has
attempted to reconcile emerging doctrines in several first amend-
ment areas and develop a more consistent approach to first
amendment issues. This comment discusses four of Justice Ste-
vens's opinions that analyze first amendment issues. Two dis-
senting opinions in Splawn v. California' and Smith v. United
1. "At various times the Court has employed the bad tendency test, the clear and
present danger test, an incitement test, and different forms of the ad hoc balancing test."T. EMmSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPREssioN 15 (1970). See also Ely, Flag Desecra-
tion: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Fuchs, Further Steps Toward a General Theory
of Freedom of Expression, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 347 (1976); Shaman, Revitalizing the
Clear-and-Present-Danger Test: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 22 ViLL. L. REv. 60 (1976).
2. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).
3. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381-82 (1977).
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
5. The Court has preferred to deal with the issues in specific contexts. Compare
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (symbolic speech) and Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (political speech) with Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975) (commercial speech) and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(obscenity).
6. See text accompanying note 42 infra.
7. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 75 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957). In both cases the major concern is the definition of obscenity.
8. Justice Stevens, appointed by President Gerald Ford, joined the Court December
15, 1975.
9. 431 U.S. 595 (1977).
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States0 deal expressly with obscenity, and reject the Court's
present method of analysis. Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc." and Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation2 both develop a balancing approach to ascertain the
constitutionality of government regulation of nonobscene offen-
sive speech. The comment concludes that Justice Stevens cor-
rectly identifies the factors necessary to insure proper Court pro-
tection of speech interests.
Under the Federal Constitution, the first amendment pro-
vides the fundamental guarantee for freedom of expression." Al-
though the Court has rarely articulated the values underlying
freedom of expression,' many commentators have attempted to
provide clear statements of these values.15 Alexander Meiklejohn,
one of the most articulate, states that the first amendment
protects the freedom of those activities of thought and commu-
nication by which we "govern." It is concerned, not with a pri-
10. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
11. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
12. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978). Although this comment limits its discussion to the listed
cases, Justice Stevens has written other opinions in first amendment cases. See Houchins
v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588, 2599 (1978) (dissenting opinion); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
98 S. Ct. 1970, 1987 (1978) (dissenting opinion); Pinkus v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1808,
1816 (1978) (concurring opinion); National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 98 S. Ct. 1355 (1978) (majority opinion); Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 777 (1977)
(dissenting opinion); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 712 (1977) (concur-
ring opinion); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (concurring and dissenting
opinion); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 617 (1976) (concurring opinion).
13. "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
. ... U.S. Const. amend. 1.
14. The most widely known judicial articulation is in Justice Brandeis's concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927):
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and'
spread of political truth; . . . that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government. . . .Believing in the power of reason as applied through
public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force
in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities,
they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed.
Id. See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (Brennan, J.);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. See generally Z. CHAEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES (1941); T. EMERSON,
supra note 1; L. LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960); A. MEKLEJOHN, POLrCAL FREEDoM
(1960). For a philosophical discusson of free speech values see J.S. MILL, ON LiBEirv
(1859).
First Amendment
vate right, but with a governmental responsibility.
* * . But in the deeper meaning of the Constitution, votingis merely the external expression of a wide and diverse numberof activities by means of which citizens attempt to meet theresponsibilities of making judgments, which that freedom togovern lays upon them. . . . Self-government can exist only
insofar as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitiv-ity, and generous devotion to the general welfare, that in theory,
casting a ballot is assumed to express."
Under this formulation the first amendment mandates almostabsolute protection for speech directly related to the politicalprocess. As the degree of attenuation between the speech and thepolitical process increases, the constitution allows a greater levelof governmental regulation. All expression, however, contributes
incrementally to the cultural development of the nation andshould be entitled to some, if not total, first amendment protec-
tion.7
The Court's interpretation of the first amendment developedduring the last sixty years' s against a strongly asserted societalinterest in controlling those types of speech enunciating unortho-
dox, harmful, or immoral views.' 9 The first amendment thusguarantees individual liberties despite society's interest in con-trolling speech. The Court, however, has held that the firstamendment does not protect all forms of speech. For certainclasses of speech the Court achieves this result by declaring thatthe form of expression is not speech. Thus, the Court's unarticu-lated judicial premise that the speech does not further the politi-cal process permits government suppression of certain speech,
16. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REv. 245, 255.
See also T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 6-7.17. The Court has implicitly recognized this principle in commercial speech cases.See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). See
also text accompanying notes 38-40 infra.
18. Modem first amendment history begins with the Espionage Act Cases, Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).Although the Court's first treatment of the issues involved political speech, since that timeit has confronted speech issues in a much wider range of situations.
19. Cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (prosecution for affixing peacesymbol to flag); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (prosecution for draft cardburning); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 467 (1957) (obscenity prosecution); Dennis v.United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (prosecution for Communist Party organizing);Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 27 (1919) (prosecution for protesting draft). Indeed,because our political system rests on majority rule, any regulation of speech enforces amajority position. Thus, when the Court affords first amendment protection to a type ofspeech it invariably upholds a minority position. See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 1.See also T. KUHN, THE STRucruRE OF Sci'rirxc REVOLUTIONS 160-73 (2d ed. 1970); E.ScHATrsCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 2-5 (1960).
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even though it does serve first amendment values.
The first use of the categorization analysis occurred in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,"0 which held that "fighting
words" were not entitled to constitutional protection.2 In subse-
quent cases the Court expanded on Chaplinsky's dicta and ex-
cluded other types of speech from first amendment protection.2
In other classes of speech the Court permits government regula-
tion based upon judicial balancing of competing values. Political
speech, for example, enjoys more protection than commercial
speech because it more clearly serves first amendment values and
government has a lesser interest in controlling it.2 Once the Court
classifies the speech, however, it applies the doctrines of that
particular area of speech, often failing to consider decisions from
other contexts.24
The Court's failure to develop a comprehensive approach to
first amendment adjudication is most obvious in the obscenity
area. 25 Here the Court relies exclusively on a categorization analy-
sis. Roth v. United States," the Court's landmark obscenity opin-
ion, marks the beginning of a line of cases that attempt to define
obscenity. Roth necessitated a constitutional definition of ob-
scenity because, in addition to holding obscenity to be nonspeech
and not entitled to first amendment protection, the Court held
nonobscene material was speech protected by the first amend-
ment.2 Although the Court has abandoned this speech/nonspeech
distinction in other areas," it refuses to do so in the obscenity
context. This refusal prevents comprehensive first amendment
adjudication and preserves the artificial categorization analysis.
Justice Stevens's initial obscenity opinions, however, point the
way toward a more comprehensive first amendment analysis.
20. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
21. Id. at 571-73.
22. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See also Ely, supra note 1;
Shaman, supra note 1.
23. Compare Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (political speech) with Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (truthful advertising)
and E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956) (false or misleading advertising).
24. The Court does not consider political speech cases if it finds the speech commer-
cial. Similarly, the Court considers obscenity cases within a narrow set of precedents. See
Shaman, supra note 1; note 5 supra.
25. See generally F. ScHAUER, THE LAW op OaacENrry (1976). See also Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. Rav. 1.
26. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
27. Id. at 484-85.
28. Compare Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (protecting commercial speech) with
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (commercial speech unprotected).
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In Splawn v. California" the Court reviewed a prosecution forthe sale of an obscene film.30 The trial court instructed the jurorsthat they could consider evidence concerning the film's sale anddistribution in determining obscenity."' Justice Rehnquist, writ-ing for the majority, relied exclusively on two obscenity cases,
Hamling v. United States, 32 and Ginzburg v. United States,13 inrejecting the first amendment challenge. Identifying a distinctarea of first amendment jurisprudence he wrote: "There is nodoubt that as a matter of First Amendment obscenity law, evi-dence of pandering to prurient interests in the creation, promo-tion, or dissemination of material is relevant in determiningwhether material is obscene."' The majority did not consider anycommercial speech cases in framing its opinion.
In Ginzburg the court held that evidence of advertising orpandering of otherwise nonobscene material could justify findingthe material involved obscene. The trial court had consideredevidence of pandering and convicted the defendant under a fed-eral obscenity statute. 5 The Court held "[wihere the purveyor'ssole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publi-cations, that fact may be decisive in the determination of obscen-ity."4 The opinion's rationale rested not on the offensive charac-ter of the advertising involved, but on the possibility the publicwould misuse the information."7 Thus, Ginsburg employed a pa-ternalistic approach resting on the Justices' beliefs of how the
information would affect the public.
29. 431 U.S. 595 (1977).30. Splawn had been convicted of a misdemeanor violation of California Penal Code§ 311.4 (West 1970). He challenged his conviction contending the jury instructions vio-lated his first and fourteenth amendment liberties. Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595,596-97 (1977).
31. The instruction in relevant part was:
In determining the question of whether the allegedly obscene matter isutterly without redeeming social importance, you may consider the circum-stances of sale and distribution, and particularly whether such circumstancesindicate that the matter was being commercially exploited by the defendantsfor the sake of its prurient appeal. Such evidence is probative with respect tothe nature of the matter and can justify the conclusion that the matter isutterly without redeeming social importance. ...
• . . If you conclude that the purveyor's sole emphasis is in the sexuallyprovocative aspect of the publication, that fact can justify the conclusion that
the matter is utterly without redeeming social importance.
Id. at 597-98.
32. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
33. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
34. 431 U.S. at 598 (citations omitted).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
36. 383 U.S. at 470.
37. See id. at 475-76.
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In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,'8
however, the Court rejected the premises of the paternalistic ap-
proach. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court held a state ban on
advertisng prescription drug prices unconstitutional. Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion recognized that the public needs
free access to information to make informed decisions.3' The
state's interest in maintaining pharmacists' professional stan-
dards was insufficient to justify closing the channels of communi-
cation, and the ban ultimately protected pharmacists' economic
interests by keeping the public ignorant. The Court, focusing on
the public's right to receive information, concluded:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this information
is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communications
rather than close them. . . . It is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dan-
gers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amend-
ment makes for us.'0
Justice Stevens dissented in Splawn because he thought
commercial speech cases should determine the decision. He noted
that in Virginia Pharmacy the Court held truthful advertising
protected notwithstanding its commercial character. This princi-
ple, he felt, precluded the majority's limited analysis in Splawn
because the trial court's instructions" allowed the jury to find the
material obscene solely on the basis of truthful, nonoffensive ad-
vertising, which in effect bans such advertising. 2 Allowing evi-
dence of advertising in obscenity prosecutions has a chilling effect
because sellers of nonobscene material may forego advertising to
avoid criminal prosecution even though Virginia Pharmacy pro-
tects such advertising. Justice Stevens concluded that Virginia
Pharmacy implicitly overruled Ginz burg.'3
Justice Stevens correctly recognizes that the majority's pa-
ternalistic approach in Splawn undermines first amendment val-
38. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
39. Id. at 764-65.
40. Id. at 770.
41. Justice Stevens emphasized the sentence: "If you conclude that the purveyor's
sole emphasis is in the sexually provocative aspect of the publication, that fact can justify
the conclusion that the matter is utterly without redeeming social importance." 431 U.S.
at 602 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 603.
43. Id. at n.2.
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ues by keeping the public ignorant. In Splawn he stated that"[ulnder any sensible regulatory scheme, truthful description ofsubject matter that is pleasing to some and offensive to othersought to be encouraged, not punished."" Indeed, nonoffensive
advertising actually furthers asserted state interests in prohibit-ing obscenity. Because advertising informs the public of the ma-
terial's explicit character, it decreases the possibility both of thematerial offending the public and of juveniles obtaining the ma-terial. 5 In contrast to the majority's myopic reliance on obscenitylaw, Justice Stevens applied principles from other first amend-
ment cases in his analysis.
Justice Stevens fully articulated his disaffection with theCourt's categorization approach to obscenity in Smith v. United
States." The Court in Smith considered the effect of a state stat-ute on a jury determination of contemporary community stan-dards in a federal obscenity prosecution. 7 Although under Iowalaw disseminating sexually explicit material to adults was legal,"the Court held Iowa law did not preclude a federal obscenityprosecution. Rather, the Court tested the conviction against the
constitutional test of obscenity enunciated in Miller v.California." In Miller, the Court retained the speech/nonspeech
distinction developed in prior obscenity cases, but held sexuallyexplicit works should be judged on a local standard instead of anational one.50 Expanding on this determination the Court inSmith held that contemporary community standards are a juryquestion, and state regulations, although admissible into evi-dence, do not bind the jury.5 Thus, the Court upheld Smith'sconviction for solely intrastate mailing of material he was entitled
to sell under state law.
Justice Stevens dissented and urged the Court to prohibit
44. Id. at 604.
45. See id. n.3.
46. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
47. Smith was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
48. 1974 Iowa Acts, chs. 1267-68 (repealed 1976 Iowa Acts, ch. 1245).
49. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
50. The three substantive parts of the Miller test are:
(a) Whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interests. ...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by applicable state law [as written or authorita-tively construed]; and (c) whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24. For a discussion of the changes brought about by the Miller standards see F.
SCHAURER, supra note 25.
51. 431 U.S. at 308.
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criminal prosecutions for obscenity because they are unworkable
and unconstitutional. First, his dissent rejected the Court's defi-
nition of obscenity. 2 Second, he argued that, although the gov-
ernment cannot totally suppress sexually explicit material
through criminal prosecutions, it may still regulate the offensive
effects of such material in other ways.1
Because Smith involved a criminal prosecution, Justice Ste-
vens stated Miller's community standard concept is inappro-
priate for determining guilt or for providing sufficient warning of
proscribed conduct." He felt the underlying rationale of the
Miller concept-the difficulty of proof of a national stan-
dard-applied equally to any standard. Indeed, he observed that
under any standard, a jury's subjective reaction to the material
in question, rather than rules of law, determines a defendant's
guilt or innocence. He concluded, "the line between communica-
tions which 'offend' and those which do not is too blurred to
delimit the protections of the First Amendment."55 Thus, all sex-
ually explicit material should be entitled to that quantum of first
amendment protection sufficient to preclude criminal prosecu-
tion.K
Justice Stevens, however, would allow reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations of offensive material. Such regula-
tions are permissible to control any detrimental effects the mate-
rial has on society.57 Citing his own opinion in Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 8 he observed that protected nonobscene
speech is not wholly immune from state regulations.5 He con-
cluded "[als long as the government does not totally suppress
protected speech and is faithful to its paramount obligation of
complete neutrality with respect to the point of view expressed
in a protected communication, . . . regulation of certain types of
communication may. . . take into account obvious differences in
subject matter." 6 Courts, however, must judge the validity of
such regulations not only against the speaker's right to air his
52. Id. at 312-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 317-21. Justice Stevens cites cases involving commercial speech, Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); access claims to public
forums, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948); and zoning, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
54. 431 U.S. at 312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 316.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 317-18.
58. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
59. 431 U.S. at 318.
60. Id.
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views, but also against the public's right of access to material,utilizing the doctrines already developed in other first amend-
ment contexts.2
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,62 Justice Stevens,writing for the Court," upheld government regulation of nonob-scene sexually explicit speech. When read in conjunction with hisopinions in other obscenity cases, Young illustrates his analysisand the limitations he feels the first amendment and the Consti-tution place on governmental regulation of speech. In Young theCourt upheld Detroit zoning ordinances requiring dispersal ofadult theaters." Theater owners, who had been denied a licenseunder the ordinances, challenged the measures as (1) violatingthe due process clause on vagueness grounds;" (2) imposing aprior restraint on protected expression; and (3) violating the
equal protection clause.1
In disposing of the prior restraint challenge, Justice Stevensfocused on the scope of the city's zoning powers and the ordi-nances' effects on the availability of adult films. Noting that thezoning power clearly extended to theaters in general,67 and that
61. Id. at 319 n.18.
62. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
63. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice, JusticeWhite, and Justice Rehnquist joined in the entire opinion. Justice Powell joined in thedisposition of the vagueness and prior restraint challenges, but submitted a separateopinion rejecting the equal protection challenge. Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall andBlackmun all joined in dissenting opinions by Justice Stewart and Justice Blackmun.64. The ordinances prohibited any new regulated uses, including adult theaters,within 1,000 feet of any two existing regulated uses. The City Council originally passedthe ordinance in 1962. They added adult theaters to the list of regulated uses in 1972,justifying the ordinances as an attempt to protect the quality of city neighborhoods. 427
U.S. at 52-55.
65. Justice Stevens disposed of the vagueness challenge by denying petitioners stand-ing. He noted that the ordinances clearly applied to the theater owners and any facialvagueness had not affected them. Then he considered the owners' right to assert vaguenessunder the overbreadth doctrine. He set forth the following test: if a statute clearly appliesto a litigant, then "if the statute's deterrent effect on legitimate expression is not 'bothreal and substantial,' and if the statute is 'readily subject to a narrowing construction bythe state courts,' . . . the litigant is not permitted to assert the rights of third parties."427 U.S. at 60 (citations omitted). He concluded that under this test respondents lackedstanding. 427 U.S. at 60-61.This test applies the "substantial overbreadth" doctrine first enunciated in Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-16 (1973). This represents a shift in the traditional Courtstance of freely allowing vagueness challenges. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402U.S. 611 (1971); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.PA. L. Rzv. 67 (1960). This test does not, however, eliminate standing to assert vaguenessclaims. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 60 (1976); Erzonznik v.City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615(1973). For a general discussion of the overbreadth doctrine see Note, The First Amend-
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAIv. L. Rav. 844 (1969).
66. 427 U.S. at 58.
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Detroit's ordinances did not limit the total market in sexually
explicit films,"8 he concluded, "[tihe mere fact that the commer-
cial exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment
is subject to zoning and other licensing requirements is not a
sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances. . . . [Tihe
regulation of the place where such films may be exhibited does
not offend the First Amendment.""
Then, writing for only a plurality, 0 Justice Stevens consid-
ered the equal protection challenge. His analysis, however, es-
chewed traditional equal protection doctrines and focused on first
amendment principles.7' He viewed the ordinance as a time,
place, manner restriction7 2 furthering a strong city interest in the
character and quality of its neighborhoods. Further, the individ-
ual right asserted was wholly commercial in nature, and, there-
fore, not fundamental, although couched in first amendment
terms .7  He noted that although the Court has spoken in broad
terms regarding content based distinctions, the content of speech
often detemines first amendment questions.75 Relying on cases
involving libel7 6 commercial speech,7 and obscenity 7 8 he stated,
67. 427 U.S. at 62.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 62-63.
70. See note 63 supra. In his disposition of the equal protection challenge Justice
Powell utilized the four part test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). That
test approved a government regulation having incidental impact on symbolic speech:
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction
on. . . First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.
Id. at 377, quoted in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 79-80 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring). Applying this test he found no denial of equal protection.
Justice Blackmun, however, thought the ordinance was unconstitutional on vague-
ness grounds, id. at 88, and Justice Stewart's dissent relied on substantive first amend-
ment doctrine. Id. at 84.
71. See 427 U.S. at 65-66. Indeed, most first amendment cases necessarily contain
an equal protection claim. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). See generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1. One commentator has stated that the first
amendment implicitly requires equal protection. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle
in First Amendment, 43 U. Cni. L. Rsv. 20, 65-68 (1975).
72. 427 U.S. at 71-73.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 65-66.
76. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
77. E.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Markham Advertising Co. v,
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"[elven within the area of protected speech, a difference in con-
tent may require a different governmental response."7 These dif-
fering responses, however, are justified not only because of the
content, but also because society has a legitimate interest in con-
trolling the time, place, or manner of speech.8 °
The Court has previously allowed reasonable time, place,
manner restrictions that further legitimate government inter-
ests."' Such regulations do not offend the first amendment either
because they control access to public forums thus preserving an
ordered society,8" or because they protect an unwilling listener's
right of privacy.8 3 Prior to Young, however, the Court permitted
only content neutral regulations. 4 Justice Stevens gave two rea-
sons why this principle was inapplicable to Detroit's ordinances.
First, regulating the place of exhibition was in fact content neu-
tral because "whether the motion picture ridicules or character-
izes one point of view or another, the effect of the ordinances is
exactly the same. 8 s5 Second, sexually explicit speech, like com-
mercial speech and libel, is subject to regulation but not suppres-
sion.81
Although the Detroit zoning ordinances distinguished be-
tween theaters because of their films' content, the city did not
attempt to suppress sexually explicit material. Rather the ordi-
nances furthered the strong city interest in reducing detrimental
effects-reduction of property values, deterioration of neighbor-
hoods, and higher crime rates-caused by de facto blue zones. 7
Accordingly, the city had not violated its obligation of neutralitym
and its interest in controlling the place and manner of the mate-
rial's presentation outweighed the theater owners' commercial
interests.81
Justice Stevens continued his assault on the Court's tradi-
State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968).
78. E.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
79. 427 U.S. at 66.
80. See, e.g., id.; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949).
81. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. New. York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948).
82. E.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 580 (1941).
83. E.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949).
84. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
85. 427 U.S. at 70.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 55.
88. Id. at 70.
89. Id. at 72.
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tional modes of first amendment adjudication in Federal Com-
munications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation.0 In Pacifica
the Court upheld the validity of a Federal Communications Com-
mission declaratory order regulating radio broadcasts of
"indecent" speech." The F.C.C. issued the order after receiving
a complaint about the early afternoon broadcast of a monologue
by comedian George Carlin titled "Filthy Words."" Justice Ste-
vens wrote a four part majority/plurality opinion that eschewed
a simplistic analysis and applied the balancing approach he first
enunciated in Young.
Before reaching the first amendment issues, Justice Stevens
limited the scope of the opinion. Noting that the F.C.C.'s order
was not an attempt to promulgate regulations but was issued in
response to a specific complaint, 3 he stated, "the focus of our
review must be on the Commission's determination that the Car-
lin monologue was indecent as broadcast."94 Thus, the opinion
only suggests future Court responses to indecent broadcast deter-
minations. Indeed, considering Justice Stevens's admonition in
Young that reasonable regulations may not substantially limit an
entire market,95 clearly the Court did not grant the F.C.C. carte
blanche authority over program content.
Justice Stevens then considered whether the first amend-
ment precluded the F.C.C. order. Pacifica argued alternatively
that the order was overbroad or that the Constitution forbids
regulation of nonobscene material." In rejecting both arguments
Justice Stevens utilized concepts developed in other first amend-
ment contexts."7
Focusing primarily on the scope of the F.C.C. order and the
90. 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
91. Id. at 3041.
92. The passage broadcast is cut five of side two on the album "George Carlin,
Occupation: FOOLE" (Little David Records, LD 1005). A transcript of "Filthy Words"
appears as an appendix to Justice Stevens's opinion. 98 S. Ct. at 3041 app.
93. 98 S. Ct. at 3032.
94. Id. at 3033.
95. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.
96. 98 S. Ct. at 3036. Prior to reaching the first amendment issues Justice Stevens
considered the effect of the statutory anticensorship provision, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). He
concluded that the provision prohibited editing in advance of broadcasts, but did not
preclude the Commission from adopting an appropriate response to completed broadcasts.
98 S. Ct. at 3033. See also Note, Regulation of Program Content By the F. C. C., 77 HIRv.
L. REv. 701, 715 (1964). For a contrary interpretation see Judge Tamm's opinion for the
court of appeals, Pacifica Foundation v. F.C.C., 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Justice Stevens also refused to require as a matter of statutory construction that the
F.C.C. find a broadcast obscene before imposing civil sanctions. 98 S. Ct. at 3036.
97. He cites cases involving political speech, libel, commercial speech, and obscenity.
See 98 S. Ct. at 3037-39.
[Vol. 2:137
First Amendment
specfic context of the broadcast, Justice Stevens refused to apply
an overbreadth analysis. 8 He noted that the Court's opinion and
the F.C.C. order were specifically limited to the Carlin monologue
as broadcast. He concluded that because indecency is tied so
closely to context, and because the order would not substantially
affect the content of serious communication, application of over-
breadth principles would be inappropriate." This view carries
forward the Court's dissatisfaction with the overbreadth doctrine
in general and focuses instead on the litigants' first amendment
claim.'"
Pacifica's substantive first amendment argument urged the
Court to adhere to the timeworn categorization approach. They
stressed that fighting words and obscenity are the only remaining
forms of constitutional nonspeech. Therefore, because the broad-
cast fell in neither category absolute first amendment protection
was appropriate. 0' The simplicity of the argument highlights the
inadequacies of the Court's categorization technique. The all or
nothing approach precludes proper judicial concern for first
amendment values. But in contrast to the rigid categorization
analysis, Justice Stevens insisted that both content and context
affect first amendment analysis.0 2
To Justice Stevens, however, content has two distinct
meanings.0 3 The first refers to the form of the expression, the
second to an analysis of the substance of the expression. Although
the former is entitled to less judicial protection, both meanings
must be considered because the first amendment's primary goal
is to insure protection of diverse points of view."' Indeed, form
and substance often coalesce when individuals enunciate offen-
sive ideas. 05 Additionally, when government jeopardizes the pub-
98. 98 S. Ct. at 3037.
99. Id.
100. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). See also note 65 supra and
authorities cited.
101. 98 S. Ct. at 3036.
102. Id. at 3038.
103. See id.
104. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
105. The classic exposition of this concept is in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971). Justice Harlan wrote:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys
not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their
emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitu-
tion, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be
the more important element of the overall message to be communicated.
Id. at 26.
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lic's first amendment right of access, the paramount judicial con-
cern is preservation of the form of expression. 08 In Pacifica, how-
ever, neither of these factors was present'07 because the F.C.C.
order regulated only the form of the expression. Therefore, the
broadcaster's first amendment claim was entitled to less weight
in the judicial balance.
The context of the speech also affects first amendment anal-
ysis because it determines the weight of the asserted government
interest. 0 In Pacifica, Justice Stevens noted that government.has
a more profound interest in the broadcast context than in other
areas. 09 This greater interest arises primarily because without
government intervention the public has no direct influence on
radio or television program content."10 Conversely, government
control of the dissemination of material in a discrete context, like
the sale of literature, cannot be justified because members of the
public exercise direct control over their purchasing decisions."
Thus, in Pacifica, Justice Stevens isolated the factors necessary
to insure a principled judicial analysis of the first amendment.
Justice Stevens's opinions, then, attempt to achieve a more
comprehensive first amendment analysis, especially in the offen-
sive speech area. His analysis rejects the Court's traditional treat-
ment of offensive speech"' and instead focuses on three essential
premises of first amendment analysis. First, the first amendment
protects two distinct interests: the speaker's right to air his views
and the public's right of access to information.13 Second, both the
106. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
107. 98 S. Ct. at 3038 n.22, 3040 n.28.
108. Compare Stanley v. Georgia 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (obscenity prosecution banned
when materials seized in private home) with Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973) (right of privacy rationale not extended to adults-only theater).
109. 98 S. Ct. at 3040-41.
110. Indeed many commentators have suggested the F.C.C. has not exercised enough
control over program content. See Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1664 (1967); Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in
Broadcasting, 22 STAN. L. REV. 863, 902 (1970); Note, First Amendment Rights of the
Broadcast Licensee and the Public Interest in Entertainment Programming, 17 WASHBURN
L. REV. 262, 288 (1978).
111. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 25-29 and 52 supra.
113. By focusing on each "right" separately the Court would insure that it protects
first amendment values. See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra. This method also
insures that the Court would be able to isolate "sham" invocations of the first amend-
ment. Thus, the theater owner in Young was not attempting to enforce his "own" right
to speak, but rather his right to engage in a commercial venture. But see Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). The result would no doubt have been different if he
had been attempting to convey a message that involved use of sexually explicit material.
See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S.
229 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, the Court upheld the
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form and the substance of expression should affect the Court's
first amendment analysis."' Finally, the first amendment per-
mits reasonable time, place, and manner regulations of communi-
cation." 5 These considerations lead to the conclusion that total
suppression of obscene communication is unconstitutional." '
In contrast to Justice Stevens's position, the Court's tradi-
tional approach permits government to completely suppress cer-
tain offensive speech."' The Court allows criminal prosecution of
obscenity based on legislative determinations that obscenity may
lead to anti-social behavior or impair the moral tone of society. "'
To Justice Stevens, total suppression is impermissible. In his
view, however, government is not powerless to protect its legiti-
mate interests. Regulations such as Detroit's zoning ordinances
are available to control the demonstrable detrimental effects of
pornographic establishments. Nevertheless, the individual's right
of expression and the public's right of access to information limit
the state's regulatory power."'
These limitations preclude total government suppression of
obscene material. Justice Stevens considers the Court's present
refusal to regard obscenity as protected speech a violation not
only of the first amendment's ban on total suppression but of
additional constitutional prohibitions as well. 20 In his view the
line between obscene and nonobscene material is impossible to
draw. Thus, any definition of obscenity, whether legislative or
judicial, violates a priori the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
of due process.' 2' Indeed, because criminal prosecutions are in-
volved this inherent vagueness violates the notion of fair warning
fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty. 2
individual's right to convey a message even though the form was offensive. See generally
Miller, Obscenity and The Law of Reflection, 51 Ky. L.J. 577 (1963). Similarly, by focus-
ing on the public's right of access the Court would insure that the "market place" remains
secure. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976).
114. See Pacifica Foundation v. F.C.C., 98 S. Ct. 3026 (1978).
115. Such regulations, however, must not affect the availability of offensive material.
See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976). See generally J. MILL, supra note
8; Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960) Kalven, supra note 67. See also
text accompanying notes 16 supra.
116. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 318 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also notes 25-27 and accompa-
nying text supra.
118. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
119. E.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 319 n.18 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
120. See id. at 315-16 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. See United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
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The Court's present approach also fails to protect adequately
the first amendment values involved in obscenity cases.1'2 3 By
removing certain material from the public domain, government
forces conformity to the social norm, to the exclusion of minority
views. Indeed, history has shown concepts condemned as hereti-
cal in one age form the basis of thought in a later age.' 24 Similarly,
full participation in the decision-making process cannot be
achieved without free access to all forms of expression because,
in forming opinions and making decisions, each individual draws
on the whole of his cultural heritage. 125 Finally, total suppression
of obscenity retards social change by maintaining majority atti-
tudes toward sex to the exclusion of minority views. Thus, totally
suppressing obscenity stifles individual self-fulfillment, impedes
the advancement of knowledge, and hinders the discovery of
truth.
Justice Stevens's approach, however, suffers from none of the
above infirmities. Limiting regulation of obscenity to time, place,
and manner restrictions allows government to protect against
ascertainable deleterious effects. 26 At the same time individuals
remain free to determine the social value of the material's con-
tent. Similarly, by focusing on the two distinct first amendment
interests of expression and access, '2 his approach more effectively
protects first amendment values. Justice Stevens's approach thus
guards against total government interference with individual self-
fulfillment and insures protection of minority viewpoints. Ac-
cordingly, this comprehensive balancing approach furthers the
first amendment's ultimate goal: allowing cultural development
through the free exchange of ideas.2 1
Arguably Justice Stevens's balancing approach is less protec-
tive of first amendment values than the present categorization
technique. The major criticism attacks his frank recognition that
offensive forms of expression are entitled to some, but not abso-
U.S. 451 (1939). Indeed, this fundamental notion supported the Court's ruling in Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977). In Marks, the petitioner was indicted prior to
the Miller decision. His trial, however, occurred after Miller and the trial court instructed
the jury according to the Miller standards. The Court ruled that Miller had substantially
altered the law of obscenity and Marks was impermissibly convicted. The specific issue
was the social value test. Justice Stevens wrote a brief concurrence outlining his view that
criminal prosecutions for obscenity are unconstitutional. Id. at 198.
123. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
124. See generally T. KUHN, supra note 19.
125. See A. MEILKEJOHN, supra note 15; T. KUHN, supra note 19.
126. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976).
127. Id.
128. See T. EMERSON, supra note 1; J. MILL, supra note 15.
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lute, first amendment protection.'29 This criticism, however, im-
plicitly adopts categorization analysis because it presupposes
that absent a finding of obscenity, speech should receive absolute
protection. Indeed, the Court has rejected this approach in com-
mercial speech, libel, and fighting words cases. 30 In those deci-
sions, the Court protected previously unrecognized first amend-
ment interests after principled analysis of the asserted govern-
mental interests.' 3' Ultimately, Justice Stevens's balancing ap-
proach is analytically sounder and more protective of speech val-
ues than the rigid categorization technique.
Although critics of balancing assert it provides insufficient
protection for civil liberties, 132 Justice Stevens's opinions show a
profound concern for the preeminence of first amendment values.
In each case he clearly articulates the distinct speech interests,
then critically examines each asserted government justification
for regulating the speech as well as the effects of the regulation.
This thoughtful analysis of the competing interests actually pro-
vides a more principled decision-making process than application
of rigid doctrines. 33
Justice Stevens's analysis of first amendment issues, then,
represents a principled effort to provide a comprehensive system
of first amendment adjudication. This effort involves an exten-
sion of recent court developments in commercial speech, libel,
and access cases. He urges that the Court completely abandon its
categorization approach to obscenity. 3 By adopting his approach
the Court would more fully protect first amendment values. Ulti-
mately, Justice Stevens's approach holds promise of realizing
129. See Friedman, Zoning "Adult" Movies: The Potential Impact of Young v. Amer-
ican Mini Theaters, 28 HASTINGS L.Q. 1293 (1977); Schauer, The Return of Variable
Obscenity, 28 HASTINS L.Q. 1275 (1977); Note, Zoning, Adult Movie Theatres and the
First Amendment: An Approach to Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 5 HosmTA L.
REv. 379 (1977).
130. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (commercial speech); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel); Hess
v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (fighting words).
131. Cf. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding fighting words
outside protection of first amendment).
132. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 129; Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance,
71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
133. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1958) (political speech). Indeed, in
Dennis Justice Frankfurter advocates a balancing approach stating "[tlhe demands of
free speech in a democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better
served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines
of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidean
problems to be solved." Id. at 524-25. See also Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on
a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1972).
134. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
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Justice Black's hope "that in calmer times, when present pres-
sures, passions and fears subside, this or some other Court will
restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place
where they belong in a free society.' ' 5
Richard G. Birinyi
135. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
